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policy, we argue that only an instrument which is suﬃciently sensitive to
the performance of a country (i.e. its debt level) will motivate the play-
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In democratic countries there has been a long-run tendency for increasing sovereign
debt ratios since the early 1970s.1 This is to some extent the result of political
business cycles. Moreover, in case of economic and ﬁnancial crises, tax-related
shortfalls in the budgets are ﬁnanced by additional debt without cutting the ex-
penditures, thereby strongly increasing debt ratios. The major problem is that
governments (and politicians) have virtually no particular short-term incentives
to reduce expenditures, since this would reduce their probability to be re-elected.
In case of a debt-related crisis, implementing and executing the appropriate mea-
sures (e.g. sharp expenditure cuts, higher taxes, etc.) to overcome the crises
normally destroy much value and may lead to severe recessions.
Elections or crises are, however, only the trigger of higher deﬁcits and debt.
The appropriate question is why debt ratios do not decline after elections or af-
ter a crisis. From an empirical point of view the most promising answers can
be found in theories based on political business cycles, political institutions and
budget institutions. First, it can be shown that budget deﬁcits tend to be higher
in election years to some extent. There is also a negative eﬀect on deﬁcits in the
year following the election. But this latter eﬀect is quite small, thus resulting in
increasing debt levels over time. Second, theories based on political institutions
show that no player in the political game (parties, interest groups, etc.) wants
to bear the cost of a budget consolidation (war of attrition). As everybody waits
until another player bears the cost, the budget consolidation will take place too
late or not at all. In this sense, budget consolidations have similar characteristics
as public goods. Third, theories based on budget institutions look at the frame-
work of the budgeting process in parliament and government. All phases of the
budget process are subject to problems well known from common pool resources.
There is some evidence, in many cases based on Swiss data, on the disciplining
eﬀects of budget institutions (e.g., debt ceilings, transparency of the budget or
voters’ ability to monitor the budget). It can also be shown that EU countries
consolidated their budgets in order to fulﬁll the Maastricht criteria and to enter
EMU. In contrast, theories based on the structure of government (i.e., political
1If we take a look at the advanced economies as a whole we can see a rising overall debt ratio
from 1970 until the beginning of the 1990s, then there is a decreasing or at least stabilizing debt
ratio until the outbreak of the ﬁnancial crisis. During the crisis the debt ratio has increased
to levels not seen since World War II (Reinhart & Rogoﬀ (2011)).
1fragmentation of the government) or on preferences of the political actors (e.g.,
partisan approach, strategic debt policy) are either rejected by a majority of
studies or have only weak evidence. Recent literature reviews can be found in
Eslava (2011), Bayar & Smeets (2009), and Mikosch & ¨ Ubelmesser (2007).
The described problems are ampliﬁed when many democratic countries issue
debt which is in some sense guaranteed by a coalition of these countries. In this
case we expect to see free-riding behavior of the rather weak countries leading
to excessive borrowing and higher debt ratios. Usual market eﬀects on a na-
tion’s interest rate do not take place or are of minor importance. Moreover, such
free-riding behavior destroys incentives for strong countries to limit debt ratios.
In the end, overall higher debt ratios will increase the interest rate. The institu-
tional structure of the EMU (centralized monetary policy and decentralized ﬁscal
policies) leads to this free rider problem and calls for a limit on deﬁcits and debt
(Feldstein (2005)). Indeed, EMU member countries which are no longer able to
access the international debt market (i.e., Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) rely on
guarantees and loans of still strong member countries. In return, these already
weak countries have to show substantial consolidation eﬀorts leading to a higher
probability for political instability and economic recessions.
Our hypothesis states that as long as the fundamental incentive structure
for governments (and politicians) is not changed in a substantial way, we will
continue running into steadily higher sovereign debt ratios and eventually into
new sovereign debt crises. Our question is simply whether there is an applicable
incentive structure for governments and politicians which prevents this spiral for
higher debt-ratios and helps to implement a long-term sustainable debt manage-
ment. On the one hand, the goal should be to minimize the probability of a
sovereign debt crisis, to mitigate the magnitude of the crisis, and to avoid the
implied large costs. On the other hand, a timely restructuring of the economy
will boost long-term economic growth and increase welfare. In this sense, the
incentive structure has preventive eﬀects, but it is not capable to solve a severe
sovereign debt crisis.
Our proposal for such an incentive structure relies on what we call performance-
sensitive government bonds (PSGB). The idea is simply to relate the coupon pay-
ments with regard to the total outstanding debt to changes in the indebtedness
of the country. As we will discuss below in more detail, such bonds will give
2governments a strong incentive (i) to timely restructure the economy, and (ii) to
limit additional debt, in order to not only avoid higher coupon payments for total
outstanding debt but also to reduce ﬁnancing costs. A major objection against
PSGB, which could be brought forward, is surely the ampliﬁed pro-cyclical eﬀect
of coupon payments. But as we argue below this feature is rather a strength and
not a weakness of PSGB.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses
the sovereign debt crisis within the EMU which includes the political measures,
the development and eﬀects of interest rate spreads as well as the sanction mech-
anisms. In section 3 we propose the concept of PSGB, the implied positive
incentives, pricing issues of this ﬁnancial instrument and objections against it.
Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Sovereign debt crisis within EMU
2.1 Political measures
On 24/25 March 2011 the European Council agreed upon the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM), a tightening up of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), a
so called ”Euro Plus Pact” and reforms of the banking sector (European Council
(2011)). This comprehensive package of measures aims to stabilize ﬁnancial mar-
kets, i.e. to lower the interest rate spreads of GIPS countries (Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain).2
A critical look at the package shows the following crucial points: A permanent
crisis mechanism, called ESM, will be installed, the no-bail-out clause is bust,
and there is still no insolvency order for sovereign countries. In contrast to these
crucial points, the reforms of the stability pact and the banking sector are more
or less cosmetic. The fundamental problems still exist, as the deﬁcit procedure
depends on political decisions and consequently there is no eﬀective and credible
sanction mechanism.
It is worth to look more closely at the two new institutions, the ESM and
2All of these measures are subject to votings within the EU and its member countries. We
concentrate our discussion on the crucial points and do not go into the details of the ongoing
decision-making process.
3the ”Euro Plus Pact”: The conditions of the ESM will not diﬀerentiate between
debtors according to their default risk. The interest rate of ESM loans will consist
of the funding cost and a charge of 200 bps (European Council (2011)). Such a
pricing structure does not oﬀer reasonable incentives for debtor countries. In the
end all countries in need of ESM help will have the same conditions. In our point
of view this characteristic - undiﬀerentiated interest rates - is the main problem
of the ESM.
The ”Euro Plus Pact” was former called ”Pact for Competitiveness” and
was proposed by Germany and France. To prevent future crises countries should
commit to reforms: e.g. national debt brakes, wage policy geared to productivity,
higher retirement ages, harmonization of the corporate tax. This is basically an
attempt to control the ﬁscal and economic policies of euro member countries in
return for guarantees and bail-outs. Such a pact is either ineﬀective or a big step
towards a ﬁscal union. The conclusions of the European Council show that the
pact will be more or less ineﬀective as individual countries will be responsible for
the policy measures.
In spite of all the decisions the real problems are still unsolved. In the mean-
time there are massive speculations about a debt restructuring in Greece and
Ireland as well as Portugal got help out of the European Financial Stability Fa-
cility (EFSF) because of sharply rising interest rate spreads. Both developments
show a lack of credibility: Without doubt the EFSF and the ESM work for small
countries (e.g., Greece, Portugal and Ireland), but for large countries (e.g., Spain
and Italy) the funds are probably not large enough. In addition, it is uncertain
whether a majority of voters in the creditor countries supports the crisis mech-
anism. Sooner or later this will put pressure on the governments in the creditor
countries (Gros & Mayer (2011)). Because of this lack of credibility a sovereign
default is still possible. It is obvious that in the long run such a system calls for
some form of ﬁscal union, maybe a political union.
In contrast to the decisions at the end of March 2011, a stable ﬁscal union
can only be the result of a long-lasting process of discussions and democratic de-
cisions. In no case a ﬁscal union is an adequate emergency solution for the debt
crisis. It is much more reasonable to stay with the original concept of a monetary
union and a decentralized ﬁscal policy. In this case diﬀerentiated interest rates
are needed to guarantee an eﬃcient allocation of capital.
42.2 Development of interest rate spreads
Figure 1: Interest rates.
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. Note: These interest rates are given by
the redemption yields which are observed on the basis of the long-term (10 years)
benchmark government bonds of the corresponding country.
Since the introduction of the euro became credible in 1996/97 until the in-
solvency of Lehman Brothers in 2008 we can see almost no interest rate spreads
between euro area countries (see ﬁgure 1). This lack of diﬀerentiation results
from an underpricing of default risk for long-term government bonds. At ﬁrst
sight this is astonishing because the SGP of 1996 contains a no-bail-out clause.
Therefore interest rates should depend on the credibility of individual debtors.
A closer look reveals that the no-bail-out clause was never regarded as binding
and therefore did not result in the required spreads. There was an implicit bail-
out assumption based on actual EMU policy: Sanctions within the SGP were
never imposed and the pact was even changed to avoid sanctions for Germany
and France (Feldstein (2005), Gros & Mayer (2011)). In the wake of Lehman
Brothers’ insolvency, however, doubts about the credibility and the bail-out of
sovereign countries arose. The interest rate spreads increased in order to com-
pensate for the default risk. Not even rescue actions could really eliminate the
5spreads since ﬁnancial markets were not sure about the extent and credibility of
the actions.
Politicians interpreted the high spreads as indicators for the crisis and there-
fore they have been trying to reduce them. But spreads are not the root of all
evil. They are needed for an eﬃcient allocation of capital and to prevent a crisis.
It should be noted that spreads were already high before the introduction of the
euro. They disappeared because the no-bail-out clause had never been credible.
Now they are back again because the rescue actions are not credible at all (EEAG
(2011)).
A very similar explanation of events in terms of currency crisis models can be
found in Arghyrou & Tsoukalas (2011). In their view the Greek debt crisis is due
to deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals and a double regime shift in mar-
ket expectations. Expectations shifted from a credible EMU commitment under
an implicit bail-out guarantee to a non-credible commitment under no guarantee.
These shifts led to the massive rise of interest rate spreads.
2.3 Allocative eﬀects of interest rate spreads
From an allocative point of view diﬀerentiated interest rates fulﬁll several im-
portant functions on the capital market. Interest rates are a signal about the
relevant risk of a credit and deliver the necessary incentives for the decisions of
debtors and creditors. If there are no diﬀerences in the interest rates and an ex-
plicitly or implicitly guaranteed bail-out by other countries exists, investors will
get completely wrong signals from the capital market. In addition, within the
EMU there is no longer an exchange rate risk for investments in countries with
low competitiveness. The result was an excessive ﬂow of capital to risky projects
in non-competitive countries (Sinn (2010)). This situation leads to a mispricing
of bonds, a misallocation of capital, and ﬁnally threatens the EMU. Undiﬀeren-
tiated interest rates and a bail-out guarantee will allocate too much capital in
relatively risky investment projects, and too little capital in investments with low
risk. Debtors with a high default risk are subject to a moral hazard problem.
There are no market incentives to lower the debt level as the individual debt level
has no eﬀect on the price of capital and in addition a ﬁnal bail-out is guaranteed.
For the whole EMU this mechanism is fatal: The overall debt level could get out
6of control and the bail-out guarantee will probably get incredible.3
The lack of interest rate spreads led to low ﬁnancing costs for countries with
low credibility. This looks advantageous in the short run. The countries are now
in a position to attract the capital needed for their investment projects. Rising
wages and prices will even dampen the relevant real interest rates. But step by
step countries lose their competitiveness on international goods markets. The
capital account surplus is followed by a current account deﬁcit. In the end this
all results in large trade and budget deﬁcits. Countries with low credibility will
import too much capital because of the mispricing of capital (EEAG (2011)).
Summing up, we need diﬀerentiated interest rates to get the right incentives
on the capital market. In the following, we will show that these allocative eﬀects
are rather weak in the short run and should be strengthened and speeded up.
Changes in the interest rate are only relevant for rolling over debt or issuing
new debt. This is extremely important for countries which have liquidity prob-
lems or which are near default (e.g., Greece, Ireland and Portugal). For these
countries (and only in the long run for all countries) the opportunity cost of debt
reduction rises with the interest rate. For countries with sound public ﬁnances
rising interest rates do not have a strong eﬀect as in the short run no (or only a
small) part of total debt is rolled over or newly issued. The ﬁxed interest rates
on the existing debt stock are not aﬀected. In this case, it takes a rather long
time until higher interest rates actually have an impact on the opportunity cost
of debt reduction. In the short run, this opportunity cost is the interest rate
paid on the retired debt. This rate is approximated with the average interest
rate paid on debt which is measured with the interest-to-debt ratio. This is the
relevant short-run cost for restructuring decisions of politicians (i.e., whether to
lower debt levels or not).
In the last 15 years the interest-to-debt ratio was decreasing in the Euro area
countries in general. The development in Germany and the GIPS countries can
be seen in Figure 2. The lower ratio is mainly the result of generally lower interest
rates since the introduction of the euro. In the years before the introduction of the
euro interest rates were relatively high (see Figure 1). During the years decreasing
interest rates have also reduced the average interest rate on outstanding debt.
3An opposite opinion can be found in De Grauwe (2011b). He doubts that the debt crisis is
caused by moral hazard. Therefore he does not believe that sanctions can help to prevent
future crises.
7Figure 2: Interest-to-debt ratio (in %).
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. Note: The interest-to-debt ratio is the
relation of interest payments on public debt to the gross debt.
Although we are now confronted with very high debt levels the incentive for
restructuring measures is even lower than some years ago. High interest rates
only have to be paid for rolling-over debt or issuing new debt. For short-term
orientated politicians it is irrelevant that existing debt has to be repaid or rolled
over at possibly higher interest rates in the long-run. We should keep in mind
that the actual debt policy would only be inﬂuenced by an instrument which
increases the average interest rate as soon as possible.
Let us discuss the eﬀects of increasing interest rate spreads on the average
interest rate a bit more in detail. These eﬀects depend on the maturities of out-
standing debt. A look at the maturity structures in the discussed countries shows
that the proportion of very-short-run debt (under one year) increased in the last
years (see Figure 3). In Germany this proportion increased from about 5% to 12%
of total outstanding debt. In Spain the development is a bit more accentuated
with a low value in the years before the ﬁnancial crises and a recent jump to rates
of 15% and above. In Ireland we can see a highly volatile proportion with very
high values in the last years (up to 37%). In Portugal the proportion of short-run
debt has been about a quarter of total debt since several years. Unfortunately,
no data for Greece is available. Without much doubt, the increased proportion is
8the result of low short-run interest rates in recent years. Countries restructured
their debt from longer to shorter maturities to lower their interest payments.4 In
return, countries are exposed to higher interest rate risks. Now that the interest
rate spreads have risen this high amount of short-run debt is a heavy burden for
the GIPS countries. An exceptionally high proportion of total debt has to be
rolled over at high and even increasing interest rates. This is one of the reasons
for the liquidity problems and impending insolvency.
Figure 3: Proportion of very short-run debt (maturity less than one year).
Source: Eurostat. Notes: The ﬁgure shows the amount of very short-run debt
(maturity less than one year) as a percentage of the overall sovereign debt. Values
for Portugal (2004), Spain (2003, 2004) and Greece (all years) are not available.
In the case of Spain and Portugal the missing values are linearly interpolated.
2.4 Other objectives
At this point reasonable objections against our sole concentration on allocative
aspects could be raised. In a monetary union undiﬀerentiated interest rates could
4The higher proportion of very-short-run debt can be a consequence of disproportionate
amounts of new or rolled over debt in the form of short-run debt or of a disproportionate
amount of maturing long-run debt which is not rolled over. In times of increasing debt levels,
i.e. in the last years, the latter argument is unlikely.
9help to fairly distribute interest and ﬁscal burdens between countries and to
stabilize the economy of less competitive countries. In the following, we discuss
whether the agreed crisis mechanisms will lead to these favourable eﬀects.
EMU countries with a low competitiveness (e.g., Greece) can no longer depre-
ciate their currencies. This is a well-known cost of a monetary union (De Grauwe
(2009)) and in this sense a burden for the aﬀected countries. There remain three
other possibilities to improve the competitiveness: First, the country can cut
wages and prices in order to get a real depreciation. This strategy comes along
with high political cost and the danger of a recession. Second, the workers of
the country can move to more competitive countries with a high labor demand.
This mechanism is so far not important within the EMU due to diﬀerences in
language and culture (Feldstein (2005)).5 Third, transfers can be paid to the
less competitive countries. When we think of the current discussion in the EMU
there are two diﬀerent kinds of such transfers: On the one hand, there are ”hid-
den” transfer payments via guarantees and credits with interest rates below the
market level. This will result in negative eﬀects and distortions on the capital
market (see above and EEAG (2011)). In the long run this is no viable solution
as it undermines the interest rate spreads and results in negative eﬀects for all
countries. But in the short run such ”hidden” transfers are politically feasible.
On the other hand, the more competitive countries (e.g., Germany) can make
direct payments to the less competitive countries (e.g., Greece). This can be
done bilaterally or via a common budget. Such direct transfers do not distort
the capital market, but they are politically not feasible. To conclude, in the long
run ”hidden” transfers are no solution. What is necessary is a mixture of lower
prices and wages, higher labor mobility and direct transfers.
We think that a discussion about direct transfer payments from rich to poor
countries within the EMU should be a starting point for a long-lasting process
towards a ﬁscal union. However, the agreed crisis mechanism has perverse distri-
butional eﬀects: A relatively poor country (e.g., Slovakia) has to pay or guarantee
for a relatively rich country which has broken the rules (e.g., Ireland). This sys-
tem is neither incentive-compatible nor fair and will cause political problems.
At ﬁrst sight, the stabilization of less competitive countries with interest rates
5If these diﬀerences are not present, labor mobility in the EMU can be quite high, e.g., the
high number of German workers in Austria. The number of Germans employed in Austria
sky-rocketed from 18.000 (1999) to 74.000 (2009). Data: Statistics Austria.
10below the market level seems reasonable. But the eﬀects of this instrument
on eﬀective demand will be low. Let us discuss the eﬀects with the help of
an example: Assume Greece is the less competitive country and the subsidized
credits are guaranteed by Germany. First, Greece can no longer aﬀord credits at
the usual interest rates. To service debt at the moment it accepts the subsidized
credits and has to cut wages and prices, increase taxes and cut public expenditures
in order to get the guarantees. This strategy will lower eﬀective demand and could
result in a recession. A better way to stabilize demand would be a well-regulated
conversion of Greek debt. Second, the subsidized credits are needed to service
debt. Eﬀectively, they are a payment from German taxpayers to German banks
if Greece will not be able to service debt in the end. The important point is
that Greek consumers do not get a huge share of these resources. Therefore
eﬀective demand in Greece will hardly increase and the stabilizing eﬀect is very
low. A more eﬀective instrument would be direct transfer payments to poor
people in Greece ﬁnanced by German taxpayers. These poor people have a high
marginal propensity to consume. In this case the transfers will increase Greek
eﬀective demand in the best possible way. Again, both reasonable proposals (debt
conversion and direct transfers to poor people in another country) are politically
not feasible.
Let us summarize: Neither distribution nor stabilization arguments are strong
enough to doubt the importance of interest rate spreads. But how can we guaran-
tee that we get the necessary diﬀerentiation of interest rates? What we need are
eﬀective sanction mechanisms that change the incentive structure of governments
(and politicians) as early and as deﬁnitely as possible (EEAG (2011)).
2.5 Are sanction mechanisms eﬀective?
The above mentioned measures of the EU against the sovereign debt crisis are
mainly focused on short-run eﬀects. In the long-run many of these instruments
could have adverse incentive eﬀects. Sanction mechanisms are eﬀective if they
result in diﬀerentiated interest rates and therefore set the right incentives. In
the following we discuss whether the various measures (SGP, ESM, eurobonds)
against the sovereign debt crisis fulﬁll this criterion.
The well-intentioned SGP failed because sanctions were never imposed. Gov-
11ernments disregarded the no-bail-out clause because creditor countries decided
to save their own banks and were afraid of contagion eﬀects. Although the no-
bail-out clause was a conditio sine qua non in the Maastricht treaty it had little
eﬀect on the ﬁscal discipline of governments after the introduction of the euro.
The irrelevance of the SGP was demonstrated in the discussion about the ﬁscal
deﬁcits of Germany and France in 2002 and the following years. As a result of a
”political wrangling” the rules of the SGP were watered down in 2005 (Feldstein
(2005)). We should learn from the ﬁrst decade of the common currency that
sanction mechanisms depending on political decisions simply do not work.6 The
only mechanism which disciplines the governments has been the capital market.
Therefore, we should strengthen the disciplining eﬀects of the capital market
(EEAG (2011)).
The characteristics of the ESM do not look any more promising. We have
already mentioned that it does not diﬀerentiate between debtors. The new crisis
mechanism can calm ﬁnancial markets in the short run if it is credible enough.
But it does not use the disciplining power of ﬁnancial markets. In contrast, it is
designed as a counter measure to market eﬀects. In the long run it will set the
wrong incentives and could even lead to a worse situation. The same is true for
the often advocated eurobonds. In the meantime there exist several proposals for
this kind of bonds but there is always an issuance of securities jointly guaranteed
by all EMU member states. In general, there is no diﬀerentiation between debtors
for these securities. In recent contributions a diﬀerentiation between debtors or at
least debt levels is considered. In Delpla & von Weizs¨ acker (2010) and De Grauwe
(2011a) common bonds (”blue bonds”) are only issued to ﬁnance sovereign debt
up to a certain threshold debt level (e.g., 60% of GDP), above this threshold only
national and therefore junior debt (”red bonds”) could be issued. Obviously, this
proposal would lead to diﬀerentiated interest rates above the threshold level.
Diﬀerentiated interest rates for blue bonds are possible through membership fees
depending on the ﬁscal stance of a country. The major advantage of eurobonds
(high liquidity of a common government bond market) does not solve the under-
lying problem of setting the right incentives for a sustainable debt management.
6This is also the view of De Grauwe (2011b), but he does not agree with our conclusions.
He interprets the SGP as a failed attempt to circumvent national parliaments. If national
politicians have to choose between political sanctions by their voters or breaking the rules of
the SGP they will choose the latter.
12A similar proposal can be found in Brunnermeier et al. (2011). According to their
blueprint a European Debt Agency buys sovereign bonds of member nations and
issues securities with the right to a senior claim (European Safe Bonds) and a
junior tranche (risky securities). In contrast to Delpla & von Weizs¨ acker (2010)
there is no joint and several liability of the member countries, but a guarantee
provided by the pool of bonds. However, all three above mentioned proposals
lack important incentive eﬀects. There is neither an automatic mechanism to
adjust interest rates nor are there eﬀects on the interest rates of existing debt.
In the literature we can ﬁnd incentive compatible proposals for rescue actions
within the EMU. In EEAG (2011) a three-stage crisis mechanism is proposed
which draws up a plan for illiquidity, impending insolvency and full insolvency
of sovereign countries. Without doubt such a mechanism will also have eﬀects
on the decisions in the pre-crisis time. Milne (2011) proposes to issue ”limited
liability” government debt. The idea is to make the level of debt service state-
contingent. In this proposal the whole debt service cannot exceed a certain
maximum level (in % of GDP). As a result, the path of debt restructuring is
known in advance. This should increase risk premia of highly indebted countries
and improve the discipline of ﬁscal policies. In contrast to Milne (2011) our
proposal is not based on the ﬁnal option of sovereign default. We employ an
early adjustment mechanism which also has eﬀects on outstanding debt.
In the next section we propose an innovative form of sovereign debt ﬁnanc-
ing, the so called performance-sensitive government bonds (PSGB). The main
characteristic of this instrument is the expansion of the disciplining eﬀects to
the formerly emitted debt. The counter-argument that higher borrowing costs
will result in higher debt levels is not really conclusive. The proposed bonds will
strengthen the incentives to consolidate the budget in due time and therefore
reduce debt levels. A similar argument can be found in EEAG (2011). PSGB do
not solve urgent debt crisis, but they should be implemented as soon as possible
to change the incentive structure of politics.
133 Performance-sensitive government bonds
Many forms of structured debt instruments are found in the capital markets where
the coupon payments are related to performance. Major examples are inﬂation-
linked bonds (see e.g., Campbell & Shiller (1996) or Deacon et al. (2004)), GDP-
linked bonds (see e.g., Borensztein & Mauro (2004) or Schr¨ oder et al. (2007)), or
debt-level related corporate bonds (see e.g., Koziol & Lawrenz (2010) or Manso
et al. (2010)).
We propose a new class of debt-level related sovereigns bonds which we call
”performance-sensitive government bonds” (PSGB) implementing three-fold in-
centives for borrowers, i.e. politicians or governments: (i) To limit the indebt-
edness of their countries, (ii) to take proactive, self-interested actions in order to
restructure the economy, and (iii) to build-up long-term reputation in order to
lower ﬁnancing costs. Furthermore, such PSGB would presumably form a com-
pletely new asset class if they constitute a broad and liquid market. This would
give (long-term institutional) buy-and hold investors a strong buying incentive
since they are compensated for changes in the default risk over time.
The construction of a PSGB is very simple and directly comparable to cor-
porate rating-trigger step-up bonds (see, for instance, Manso et al. (2010)). The
regular coupon payment of PSGB is a function of some veriﬁable underlying
variable such as the ratio of debt outstanding to GDP or some form of price in-
formation (e.g., CDS spread). Similar to the construction of a standard ﬂoating
rate note, the coupon rate is adjusted over time based on a pre-speciﬁed sched-
ule, agreed upon at the time of issuance. Hence, PSGB combine a short-term
adjustment of the risk-related interest rate with the possibility of a very long-term
maturity. If, for example, the ratio of debt outstanding to GDP increases from
60% to 65%, the schedule may imply that the coupon rate has to be increased
by, say, 20 bps. Yet, when the ratio eventually goes down from 65% to 60% after
some time the coupon rate should go down by 20 bps back to the initial level.
Thus, according to the evolution of the underlying, coupon payments may
go down or up. But most importantly, good or bad economic policy driving
the value of the underlying is almost instantaneously reﬂected in the overall
coupon payments of a debitor. This implies that politicians would also be directly
confronted with either additional interest payments (bad policy) or lower interest
payments (good policy). PSGB would therefore implement a much more direct
14link between economic policy and economic consequences, thereby immediately
inﬂuencing the current budget available as well as indeed the probability of re-
election for politicians. The voluntary issuance of PSGB would give investors
a credible signal of keeping low debt balances and promoting economic growth,
simply because self-interested incumbents want to be re-elected.
But of course, why should governments voluntarily issue PSGB at all? They
have to give up valuable options for renegotiation at the expense of investors,
and the freedom of possible decisions would shrink considerably. One could argue
that such options are valuable and already priced in equilibrium as an additional
premium, giving room for potentially lower interest rates. Thus, in the case of
PSGB investors are faced with overall lower risk levels, resulting in lower risk
premiums. The voluntary usage of PSGB could be interpreted as a powerful self-
binding device. Analogies can be drawn to inﬂation-linked bonds, which commit
to maintain low inﬂation rates (see Campbell & Shiller (1996)). Governments
who deny using PSGB would implicitly signal to investors and voters that they
are not able or do not want to limit debt levels and promote higher long-term
growth rates. Investors would punish such debitor countries with higher risk
premiums. This would presumably constitute a form of separating equilibrium,
distinguishing between good and bad policy countries. In corporate ﬁnance,
Koziol & Lawrenz (2010) found such an equilibrium for companies that issue
rating triggered bonds. But indeed, these theoretical propositions are not yet
empirically tested.
We proceed as follows: In section 3.1 we demonstrate how costly short-term
interests of politicians can be and that the use of straight bonds fosters this post-
poning. In section 3.2 we claim cost advantages of PSGB (i.e., lower coupon
payments) by analyzing the pricing based on an arbitrage-free setting. Finally,
in section 3.3, we discuss possible objections against PSGB.
3.1 The economic costs of postponing restructuring
We identify at least two drivers of economic costs of postponing restructuring,
which are short-term orientation of politicians and their limited willingness to re-
structure. The ﬁrst driver, as mentioned above, is that politicians act mostly in a
short-term orientated manner within political business cycles. Certain incentives
15like maximizing the probability of re-election tilt politicians towards a rather
short-term economic policy, leaving the economic rents of their voters largely
unaﬀected or even improved. Such a policy comes with huge opportunity costs,
though. Given that timely structural changes result in a higher growth path
for the whole economy the foregone long-term gains or, equivalently, the present
value of the expected additional values of futures goods and services could be
extremely high. For example, we assume that the GDP follows a geometric
Brownian motion with the following characteristics
dY
Y
= µldt + σdw, (1)
where dw is the increment of a Wiener process and µl and σ are constants. When











where µh > µl. Suppose µl = 0.01, µh = 0.02 and r = 0.04. Thus a diﬀerence
of 1 percentage point in the expected growth rate alone increases the PV from
33.33 to 50, an increase of 50%.
From the reasoning above it is obvious that postponing restructuring from
year to year is extremely costly for the society, but such a policy may well serve
short-term re-election interests of politicians and lobbying groups. Thus, linking
long-term needs of the whole society to the short-term self-guided interest of
politicians as it is proposed via PSGB, turns out to be very helpful.
The second driver is the limited willingness of politicians to undertake restruc-
turing. Assume that if exactly because of restructuring actions the short-term
growth rate is expected to be (slightly) lower (say for the next one or two years,
before a sustainable higher growth path is reached), available short-term budgets
will shrink immediately. In this situation, politicians have generally two options
(which may be combined): To cut spending or to increase the deﬁcit. Clearly,
the ﬁrst option immediately impacts the probability of re-election whereas the
16second postpones the problems at rather low costs for the politicians. To see this,
assume the outstanding debt has an average maturity of 10 years, such that every
year 10% must be rolled-over. Thus, only a small fraction of the outstanding debt
is re-priced every year. Postponing restructuring may increase the re-ﬁnancing
costs immediately, but the eﬀect of higher interest rate payments on the total out-
standing debt is smoothed over a long time. If the average coupon of the total
outstanding debt is 5% and the new coupon rate for the rolled-over debt (10% of
total outstanding debt) and additional debt (e.g., 5% of total outstanding debt)
is 6% or 100 basis points higher, the resulting new average coupon rate after
transactions is 5.14%. Given that 50% of total outstanding debt is structured as
PSGB, then 55% (i.e., all PSGB and 10% of the remaining straight debt) of the
total outstanding debt as well as the additional 5% would be re-priced, yielding
a new average coupon rate of 5.57%. Given that 75% of total outstanding bonds
are PSGB, then the average coupon rate will rise to 5.79%.
Therefore we expect that PSGB implement incentives towards a sustainable
debt management and lead to a long-term growth orientated policy.
3.2 Pricing issues
Although PSGB encourage politicians to limit relative debt levels it is not clear
why they should imply positive incentives to restructure the economy since short-
term growth rates and hence the available budget are expected to fall. But
there is a direct connection between expected long-term growth rates and the
ﬁnancing costs of debt: Given the observable willingness (e.g., by using PSGB) for
restructuring is creditable from the investors’ point of view, higher expected long-
term growth rates should lead (ceteris paribus) immediately to lower required cost
of capital. Investors value the decision to restructure early positively and will
thus demand lower coupon payments compared to the case of no restructuring.
Given our postulated dependency, re-pricing of PSGB and moderate additional
debt could perform at a lower coupon rate, immediately decreasing the overall
interest rate payment. From a politician’s point of view a higher share of the
budget would be available for other tasks. Similar considerations can be found
before the issuance of inﬂation-linked bonds which may eliminate the inﬂation
risk premium and thus result in lower ﬁnancing costs (Sack & Elsasser (2004)).
17Additional to these considerations, we propose in this section a pricing model
for PSGB. Our aim is to clarify the advantages of PSGB in the case of timely
preventing debt crises like for instance in Greece or Portugal. A rising debt-
to-GDP ratio would have led early to increasing costs of debt and thus forced
important structural changes in the economy in due time.
Consider the following simple model for a PSGB to illustrate pricing issues.
Let us introduce the state variable s which is deﬁned, say, as the ratio of outstand-




= µpdt + σdw, (4)
where µp is the drift parameter under the physical probability measure, dw is
the increment of a Wiener process, and σ scales the risk. This approach is along
the lines of Jeanneret (2009) who uses a standard corporate ﬁnance continuous-
time model in order to value a country’s debt and sovereign net wealth (equity)
position. Observe that s has a reﬂecting barrier at s = 0, so the process cannot
become negative, i.e., there is always some kind of government debt around.
Moreover, we assume that there is an exogenous upper threshold sd (e.g., 1.5 or
150%) at which default has to be declared. Our goal is to price government debt
as a derivative with respect to the state variable s.
Let us focus only on perpetual government bonds with continuous coupon
payment k and, if applicable, a variable component ms, where m is the additional
cash ﬂow for s = 1.7 Since s varies over time, the variable component is sometimes
higher or lower. Applying risk-neutralized pricing techniques allows us to state
the drift under the risk-neutralized probability measure as
µ = µp − φσ, (5)
where φ is the market price of cash ﬂow risk.8
Utilizing Ito’s lemma enables us to derive the dynamics of any derivative F(s)
7We use the assumption of a perpetual government bond since we expect PSGB as a long-term
debt instrument with maturities of about 30 years.
8The market price of cash ﬂow risk can be attained by risk neutral expectations with two assets
(Ingersoll (1987), for instance, derives the market price of risk for nonprice variables).
18with respect to s as follows:
























Observe that line 3 is, relative to line 2, adjusted twofold. Switching from the
physical probability measure to the risk-neutralized probability measure means to
adjust the drift rate from µp to µ and simultaneously to substitute the increment
of the initial Wiener process dw with an equivalent one, dwQ.
Since in market equilibrium the expected return under the risk-neutralized
probability measure must be equal for all securities, we can simply assume that
this rate is r, the risk-free rate. Taking expectations using the risk-neutralized
probabilities we get
E
Q [dF + (ms + k)dt] = rFdt. (7)
Using our expression dF and observing that for a perpetual bond Ft = 0, we






2Fss + µsFs − rF + ms + k = 0. (8)


















2σ2 , and A1 as
well as A2 are arbitrary constants.
In order to receive a reasonable solution for F(s), we set A1 equal to zero to
make sure that the speciﬁc solution is bounded. We have two boundary conditions
for our bond: (i) If s → 0 it should follow that F(s) → k
r. (ii) If s = sd it should
follow that F(sd) = Z, where Z is the recovery value in case of default.




















Note that the overall payments a country has to pay in the case of PSGB will be
k + ms.
Alternatively, the coupon payments for straight debt are k0. The closed-form















These solutions allow us to compare both bonds in a straightforward manner.
For an illustration we assume a coupon payment of k = k0 = 3 and a risk
free interest rate of r = 0.03.9 The standard deviation of the debt-to-GDP
ratio process is given as σ = 0.02. The default threshold is, e.g., determined
as sd = 1.5 and the recovery value is Z = 50. In this example, we assume the
variable component to be equal to m = 2, which means that if, e.g., s = 1, the
additional cash ﬂow is 2 and the overall coupon payment of the PSGB will be 5.
Figure 4 shows the value of performance-sensitive debt and straight debt.
Since for PSGB, the coupon payments will increase with a rising debt-to-GDP
ratio, the value of the proceeds will increase too. Nonetheless it is worthwhile to
see the rather diﬀerent states of the value for straight and performance-sensitive
debt. At ﬁgure 4a, the value of both bonds depending on the debt-to-GDP ratio s
(x-axis) and on the drift rate µ (y-axis) is depicted. Figure 4b shows the value for
PSGB depending on the debt-to-GDP ratio for three diﬀerent parameter values
of µ (i.e., µ = −0.02, µ = 0 and µ = +0.02). The value of PSGB is quite
sensitive with respect to s for all values of µ. This is the case since in the pricing
of these securities the variable component as well as µ is included. Figure 4c
in turn plots the value of straight bonds depending on the debt-to-GDP ratio
for the same three diﬀerent parameter values of µ. In the case of a negative µ,
the value is very insensitive with respect to s since it is quite unlikely that the
default threshold sd is hit. Only for a positive µ, the function seems to loose
9A considerably higher risk-free interest rate may remove the positive eﬀects of PSGB. The
payments in the far future are much less valued and thus the long-term eﬀects of this instrument
may become negligible.
20this insensitivity. It should also be noted for a proper interpretation that the
illustrations in ﬁgure 4 reﬂect a static case in which µ will not change its level
over time.
In the following we analyze two diﬀerent scenarios: (i) one uniform drift rate
µ, regardless of whether straight bonds or performance-sensitive bonds are issued,
and (ii) two diﬀerent drift rates µPSGB and µStraight, where µPSGB < µStraight.
Scenario (i) can be the case when only straight bonds are issued and the trea-
sury considers to introduce PSGB. The drift rate has to be the same since PSGB
have not yet been issued. In contrast, the second scenario reﬂects the situation
in which PSGB are already issued. The issuance of PSGB will lead to a better
sovereign debt management and also to a timely restructuring of the economy.
In the medium- and long-term, all these activities should lead to a decrease in
the ratio of outstanding debt balance to GDP. Therefore scenario 2 covers the
case where µPSGB < µStraight.
3.2.1 Scenario 1: One uniform drift rate µoverall
We take the same assumptions as in the illustration above and assume in addi-
tion a uniform drift rate of the debt ratio of µoverall = 0.02. The value of the
performance-sensitive debt for s = 1 is 108.92 and the coupon payments are 5
(3 ﬁxed and 2 variable coupon). We then compute the equivalent coupon pay-
ment for straight debt in order to receive the same proceeds as in the case of
PSGB. The coupon payment for a straight bond is 5.39 and thus when s = 1,
the initial coupon payment for PSGB is lower (-0.39) compared to the payment
of straight bonds. Note that within this exercise, we only compare the pricing of
initial coupon payments for the ﬁrst period after issuance. Whereas the coupon
payments for straight debt will be constant for, e.g., the following 9 years (i.e., a
bond with ten years maturity), the coupon payments for PSGB will change over
time - depending on the ratio of debt to GDP. Thus if the politicians will be able
to decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio, even lower payments in the case of PSGB are
the consequence. Table 1 compares the initial coupon payments for diﬀerent debt
ratios.
The last column in table 1 indicates that in almost all cases, the initial coupon


































Figure 4: Value of performance-sensitive and straight debt depending on debt-to-GDP ratio s
and drift rate µ.
Source: Own calculations. Notes: 4a shows the value of PSGB (upper layer)
and straight bonds (lower layer) depending on both, debt-to-GDP ratio (s) and
drift rate (µ). 4b shows the value of PSGB for diﬀerent parameter values of µ
(i.e., µ = −0.02 (thick line), µ = 0 (dashed line) and µ = +0.02 (dotted line)).
4c shows the value of straight bonds for diﬀerent parameter values of µ (i.e.,
µ = −0.02 (thick line), µ = 0 (dashed line) and µ = +0.02 (dotted line)). The
chosen parameter values are: r = 0.03, σ = 0.02, k = 3, k0 = 3 and m=2.
22s F(s) kPSGB kStraight ∆
0.01 101.80 3.02 3.05 -0.03
0.10 113.85 3.20 3.45 -0.25
0.20 122.71 3.40 3.79 -0.39
0.30 128.32 3.60 4.08 -0.48
0.40 131.33 3.80 4.33 -0.53
0.50 132.10 4.00 4.56 -0.56
0.60 130.86 4.20 4.75 -0.55
0.70 127.80 4.40 4.94 -0.54
0.80 123.05 4.60 5.10 -0.50
0.90 116.72 4.80 5.25 -0.45
1.00 108.92 5.00 5.39 -0.39
1.10 99.70 5.20 5.52 -0.32
1.20 89.15 5.40 5.65 -0.25
1.30 77.31 5.60 5.76 -0.16
1.40 64.25 5.80 5.87 -0.07
1.49 51.48 5.98 5.97 +0.01
Table 1: Comparative statics of scenario 1.
Source: Own calculations. Notes: The table shows the results from scenario 1.
We compute the initial coupon payment of PSGB, kPSGB, and the value of debt
F(s) for diﬀerent s. Then we solve for the equivalent initial coupon payment
for a straight bond, kStraight, and compare both coupon payments. The chosen
parameter values are: r = 0.03, σ = 0.02, k = 3, m = 2 and µoverall = 0.02.
Remember: kPSGB = k + ms and kStraight = k0.
debt. Only very near to the default threshold sd, the coupon rate will be lower for
the straight bond. Thus introducing PSGB would lead in almost all cases of this
scenario to lower initial coupon payments for the government. As argued earlier
in this section, investors may additionally demand lower coupon payments per se
since politicians commit themselves to early structural changes which minimize
the risk of a default.
Short-term orientated politicians should be tempted to issue PSGB because
of their lower initial coupon payments. As soon as they have issued such bonds
they are bound to their own decissions. If they do not commit to a solid ﬁscal
policy the drift rate µ and the coupon rate will increase. This will force govern-
ments to restructure their policy.
233.2.2 Scenario 2: Distinct drift rates µPSGB and µStraight
This scenario addresses the case in which we assume that depending on the debt
instrument, the drift rate of the debt ratio s is diﬀerent. In particular this means
that we assume a negative drift rate of the debt ratio (µPSGB = −0.01) for the
performance-sensitive bonds and a positive drift rate (µStraight = 0.02) for the
straight bonds. It is important to note that these parameter values are chosen
just as an illustration and only for clariﬁcation of the pricing behavior.
We repeat the exercise of scenario 1 and compare the initial coupon payments
(table 2). In this case observe that the coupon payments of PSGB will decrease
over time because of the negative drift rate. In addition, in most cases the initial
coupon payments are lower for performance-sensitive debt than for straight debt;
only for very low debt ratios (i.e., s = 0.1 and s = 0.2) the initial payments will
be smaller for conventional debt.
A debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 50% implies considerable savings in terms
of initial coupon payments for PSGB. This results from the negative drift rate
already being priced into the coupon payments of the performance-sensitive debt,
but supposing µPSGB will remain constantly negative, the payments will decrease
even more over time.
These scenarios show that PSGB oﬀer in fact both short-term and long-term
incentives. In the short run there will be lower initial coupon payments and in
the long run there is the prospect for even lower payments through timely re-
structuring.
3.2.3 Budget-relevant costs for both bond classes
Let us take a closer look on the budget-relevant cost after issuing bonds. Let us
focus on the next, say, 5 years since this time frame reﬂects a normal election
period. For simplicity we ignore the possibility that the default threshold is hit
and the coupon payments are stopped.
Consider an initial debt-to-GDP ratio of s = 0.8. From table 1 (µ = 0.02) we
know that for an initial coupon payment of kPSGB = 4.6 in the case of PSGB, the
straight bond has to oﬀer kStraight = 5.1 to get the same proceeds from investors.
The (expected) cumulated cash outﬂows K over the next ﬁve years (i.e., T = 5)
24s F(s) kPSGB kStraight ∆
0.01 100.50 3.02 3.02 ±0.00
0.10 105.00 3.20 3.18 +0.02
0.20 110.00 3.40 3.39 +0.01
0.30 115.00 3.60 3.64 -0.04
0.40 120.00 3.80 3.94 -0.14
0.50 125.00 4.00 4.29 -0.29
0.60 130.00 4.20 4.72 -0.52
0.70 135.00 4.40 5.25 -0.85
0.80 140.00 4.60 5.94 -1.34
0.90 145.00 4.80 6.84 -2.04
1.00 150.00 5.00 8.11 -3.11
1.10 155.00 5.20 10.00 -4.80
1.20 160.00 5.40 13.15 -7.75
1.30 164.94 5.60 19.43 -13.83
1.40 166.94 5.80 37.35 -31.55
1.49 87.27 5.98 114.05 -108.07
Table 2: Comparative statics of scenario 2.
Source: Own calculations. Notes: The table shows the results from scenario 2.
We compute the initial coupon payment of PSGB, kPSGB, and the value of debt
F(s) for diﬀerent s. Then we solve for the equivalent initial coupon payment for
a straight bond, kStraight, and compare both coupon payments. The diﬀerence
to scenario 1 is that we use diﬀerent drift rates: µPSGB < µStraight. The chosen
parameter values are: r = 0.03, σ = 0.02, k = 3, m = 2, µPSGB = −0.01 and
µStraight = +0.02. Remember: kPSGB = k + ms and kStraight = k0.















Note that the physical drift rate is used for calculating real cash ﬂows. The
implied assumption for the above calculation is therefore µp = µ. Moreover, it
can easily be shown that under scenario 1 the cumulated cash outﬂows are lower
for PSGB compared with equivalent straight bonds for any period up to T = 26
years. If we set, for example, µp = 0.05 (i.e., an implied risk premium of 3%),
this change would reduce the break even period from 26 years to T = 10.4 years.
This general result is clearly reinforced under scenario 2, where the introduc-
25tion of PSGB allows for assuming a negative physical drift rate (µPSGB = −0.01)
because of changed incentives.10 According to the initial values in table 2 the
cash outﬂow over the next 5 years is given by:
KStraight = 29.7
E[KPSGB] = 22.8
Even better, under scenario 2 the (expected) cumulated cash outﬂows are always
(much) lower for PSGB compared with equivalent straight bonds for any given
period up to inﬁnity.
To conclude this section, simple calculations showed that the budget-relevant
coupon payments are notably lower for PSGB in both scenarios for the next 5
years (and beyond). This should give a strong incentive for governments and
politicians to opt for such bonds.
3.3 Objections against PSGB
Notwithstanding their positive incentive eﬀects, using PSGB could presumably
lead to more ﬁnancial instability. Higher debt levels would increase coupon pay-
ments, which in turn would further increase deﬁcits. This could perhaps lead to a
downward spiral with no escape. This argument does, however, ignore the long-
term incentive eﬀects of PSGB. Rational politicians have an incentive to react
immediately to a negative external shock. This should maintain required interest
rates at a low level, since investors discount long-term expectations. Moreover,
politicians have no short-term incentive to let ﬁscal deﬁcits escalate because they
are immediately punished by higher borrowing rates for new debt and higher
coupon payments on PSGB. Since PSGB make overall interest payments much
more sensitive to good or bad economic policy, politicians are well advised to
smooth debt balances, to build up a reputation as a reliable borrower, and to
tackle structural problems very early. Thus, the hope is that the probability for
a debt crisis could be signiﬁcantly reduced.
Another obstacle could be a lack of secondary market liquidity. Indeed, when
only a small fraction of outstanding debt levels are PSGB, investors will require a
10Again, we assume implicitly µp = µ.
26substantial liquidity premium, reducing the potential advantages from lower risk
levels compared to straight bonds. Thus, PSGB should be initially introduced
with large nominal amounts, allowing for liquid secondary markets. In this regard
our proposal could be easily combined with other proposals (e.g. Brunnermeier
et al. (2011)). An debt agency could buy already placed PSGB, issued by several
countries, directly from investors. Pooled cash ﬂows from these PSGB could be
used to service diﬀerent tranches. Large senior tranches would then constitute a
very liquid, and essentially risk-free debt market.
Some minor objections are the complexity of PSGB and the risk of manipu-
lation of the underlying variables as it was done in the case of Greece. We argue
that complexity is no real problem, given that the pre-speciﬁed pricing sched-
ule is transparent. Professional investors will develop a pricing standard since
they have a good sense to price even more complex securities like, for instance,
inﬂation-linked bonds. After a very short time the market will establish a pric-
ing standard for PSGB. Indeed, PSGB must rely on veriﬁable, manipulation-free
underlying variables, such as debt ratios or yearly averages of CDS-spreads. This
job could easily be done by an independent agency (such as Eurostat).
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we propose a new debt instrument, so called PSGB. This innovative
form of sovereign bonds leads to important incentives for politicians and govern-
ments in order to reach the following goals: (i) To limit the indebtedness of their
countries, (ii) to take proactive, self-interested actions in order to restructure the
economy, and (iii) to build up long-term reputation in order to lower ﬁnancing
costs.
We discuss why the current debt management is lacking important incentives
or - in some cases - even gives wrong incentives which reinforce the moral hazard
problem. We fully agree on the importance of interest rate spreads between the
EMU countries. PSGB, however, could additionally strengthen and speed up
consequences. Whilst a rising interest spread only has an eﬀect on new or rolled-
over debt, PSGB inﬂuence all debt outstanding, leveraging the consequences of
policy decisions directly on governments or politicians.
27At ﬁrst glance, issuing PSGB makes little sense for politicians since they give
up many possibilities to serve their interest groups. Instead, we show that the
issuance of PSGB makes sense since it lowers the coupon payments and therefore
lowers budget constraints and reduces the long-term default risk premium.
To sum up: We argue that PSGB are a promising new debt instrument which
helps to set strong incentives for policy makers to limit debt levels and to timely
restructure the economy.
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Abstract
We argue that current sovereign debt management lacks important incentives for go-
vernments and politicians to fulll it in a sustainable and long-term orientated way.
This paper outlines that the mechanisms to solve sovereign debt problems within
the EMU are not only missing the right incentives but also setting the wrong ones.
In contrast to current policy, we argue that only an instrument which is suciently
sensitive to the performance of a country (i.e. its debt level) will motivate the players
to engage in sustainable debt management. Specically, we propose performance-
sensitive government bonds (PSGB) where coupon payments are closely linked to
debt policy, giving strong incentives to limit debt levels and to timely restructure
the economy.
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